OPINION — On June 13, 2025, simply after midnight, Israel launched a navy operation in opposition to Iran, citing an pressing must halt Tehran’s march towards nuclear weapons functionality. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified the strike by claiming that “if not stopped, Iran might produce a nuclear weapon in a really brief time. It might be a 12 months. It might be inside a number of months”. This justification nevertheless is at odds with the consensus held till that time by the U.S. intelligence group and most worldwide nuclear consultants. For years, that consensus had held agency: Iran was increasing its civil nuclear program, and continued to counterpoint uranium however had not made the political resolution to construct a bomb. If Netanyahu’s declare, echoed by Donald Trump, is correct then Israel and the USIC will need to have obtained game-changing intelligence that eluded each main intelligence company so far. But when the longstanding assessments of the U.S. intelligence group and impartial consultants nonetheless maintain true, then the justification for the strike raises the troubling prospect of a politicization of intelligence on a scale not seen because the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Israel’s Strike and Its Rationale
Simply earlier than daybreak on June 13, Operation Rising Lion roared to life as greater than 200 Israeli warplanes—together with F-35I stealth fighters alongside F-16s and F-15s—took to the skies. In a matter of hours, they unleashed over 330 precision-guided bombs on roughly 100 rigorously chosen targets throughout Iran. The strike hit a few of the most delicate and closely fortified websites within the nation: the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, underground nuclear bunkers close to Isfahan, missile installations close to Tabriz and Kermanshah, and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRCG) command facilities outdoors Tehran.
Crucially, the success of the air marketing campaign rested not solely on airpower however on an intricate net of clandestine intelligence operations. Within the weeks main as much as the strike, Mossad brokers reportedly infiltrated Iranian territory, deploying smuggled drones, decoys, and explosive gadgets to quietly sabotage essential air protection techniques, missile batteries, and radar installations. These covert actions—guided by extremely particular intelligence on Iranian navy infrastructure and response protocols—crippled Iran’s means to detect or repel the incoming assault. Because of this, Israeli fighter jets have been capable of penetrate deep into Iranian airspace with minimal early resistance, putting high-value targets with precision and pace.
The results have been swift and extreme. Estimates of deadly Iranian casualties vary from 224 confirmed to over 400, together with high-ranking officers—most notably IRGC commanders Hossein Salami and Mohammad Bagheri—and a lot of nuclear scientists. Iran has since retaliated with a barrage of missiles and drones focusing on Israeli cities—Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem—leading to dozens of civilian and navy fatalities and marking the clearest navy alternate between the 2 states on file.
The dimensions and precision of Operation Rising Lion made one factor instantly clear: Israel had gathered remarkably detailed intelligence on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and navy command. Dozens of deeply buried or dispersed amenities have been hit concurrently, demonstrating not solely technical and navy functionality however intimate information gained by intelligence of the areas of key Iranian particular person targets and amenities.
But this operational success—and Iran’s response—has in some ways overshadowed the central query of the justification of the operation. On the night time of the strike, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the mission was important to “roll again the Iranian risk to Israel’s very survival,” warning that Tehran was solely a 12 months—probably even months—away from buying a nuclear weapon. Israeli navy officers echoed this urgency, claiming that they had obtained proof of concrete progress in Iran’s efforts to construct weapons elements, together with a uranium metallic core and a neutron initiator—applied sciences central to assembling a functioning nuclear bomb. Briefly, Israel’s message was unequivocal: this was not a preventive strike primarily based on a theoretical future risk, however a preemptive motion in opposition to a near-term, tangible nuclear hazard.
However this justification stands in sharp distinction to what most intelligence businesses and nuclear consultants believed till now. For years, the broad consensus—shared by the U.S. intelligence group, the Worldwide Atomic Vitality Company (IAEA), and lots of impartial analysts—was that Iran had not but taken the step towards constructing a nuclear weapon.
The Intelligence Image: What We Knew Earlier than the Strike
Within the lead-up to Israel’s strike, the prevailing view amongst worldwide intelligence businesses and nuclear consultants was that Iran’s nuclear program, whereas more and more superior, had not crossed the brink into weaponization. Tehran has persistently insisted that its nuclear actions are peaceable and that it has by no means sought to construct a bomb. Whereas a decade-long investigation by the IAEA concluded that Iran carried out work associated to nuclear weapons between the late Eighties and 2003—beneath the now-defunct “Challenge Amad”—it discovered that these actions have been halted and that there have been “no credible indications” of weapons improvement after 2009.
The 2015 Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA), signed by Iran and 6 world powers, sought to freeze any weapons pathway by putting strict limits on uranium enrichment and permitting intrusive IAEA inspections in alternate for sanctions reduction. That settlement was considerably undermined when the USA withdrew in 2018 beneath President Donald Trump, reimposing sanctions and prompting Iran to progressively escalate its nuclear actions in retaliation. By 2021, Iran had resumed enrichment at its once-restricted Fordo underground facility, reaching 60% purity—a technically important step however nonetheless wanting weapons-grade (90%).
Most significantly, even amid these breaches, Western intelligence businesses and the IAEA maintained that Iran had not made the political resolution to develop a nuclear weapon. Their assessments emphasised rising concern over diminished transparency and sooner enrichment, however stopped wanting declaring {that a} bomb was imminent. Simply days earlier than the Israeli strike the IAEA’s board of governors handed a decision formally declaring Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations—an indication of mounting frustration, however not a definitive affirmation of weaponization. Whereas it’s clear that Iran’s nuclear trajectory had grow to be extra worrisome in the previous couple of years, the intelligence image didn’t recommend {that a} weapon was imminent—nor that any “level of no return” had but been crossed.
This restrained view was echoed in the latest Annual Risk Evaluation printed by the U.S. intelligence group in March 2025. The report concluded unequivocally: “We proceed to evaluate Iran is just not constructing a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, although stress has most likely constructed on him to take action.” It added that “previously 12 months, there was an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates inside Iran’s decisionmaking equipment.” In a public listening to earlier than the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 25, Director of Nationwide Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard supported that view, declaring that Iran was not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon.
The IAEA’s personal reporting, launched only a week earlier than the Israeli strike, aligned broadly with this angle. The 22-page declassified report warned that the company might not confirm the completely peaceable nature of Iran’s nuclear program, citing a scarcity of cooperation and unresolved questions on previous undeclared actions. Nevertheless, it didn’t assert that Iran was actively growing a nuclear weapon or {that a} threshold had been crossed. Whereas considerations about Iran’s enrichment ranges and transparency had undoubtedly intensified, neither the IAEA nor the U.S. intelligence group had concluded that Iran was getting ready to constructing a bomb. That, till Israel’s operation, remained the shared judgment.
In a shocking activate 20 June, Tulsi Gabbard finally backed President Netanyahu’s claims. As reported by the Wall Road Journal, Gabbard joined the White Home State of affairs Room throughout U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear websites and clarified in a while social media that “America has intelligence that Iran is on the level it might probably produce a nuclear weapon inside weeks to months, in the event that they determine to finalize the meeting”. This shift adopted public criticism from Trump—who initially dismissed the ODNI’s testimony and the assessments of the intelligence group as “mistaken”.
Forceful public assessments like these made by Netanyahu, Trump and Tulsi Gabbard are hardly ever issued in isolation. In democratic states, such high-stakes declarations—significantly those who pave the way in which for navy motion—are nearly all the time grounded, a minimum of partly, in categorised intelligence briefings. Operation Rising Lion demonstrated the extraordinary precision and attain of Israeli intelligence, significantly the capabilities of Mossad and the Israeli Protection Forces (IDF), suggesting that Israel might certainly have uncovered new and extremely particular data that shifted its risk notion. This essential intelligence would little doubt have been shared with the USIC. However these statements elevate the essential query of figuring out what intelligence precisely did Israelis accumulate to help such a stark depiction of the Iranian risk. And extra broadly, what function did that intelligence play—not simply in shaping inner decision-making, however in developing the general public justification for warfare.
A Failure to See—or a Case Constructed to Persuade?
If Israel’s and US – revised – assessments are correct, then the world has simply witnessed one of the important failures of intelligence assessments by Western businesses in a really very long time. It will recommend that Tehran had quietly superior previous a essential threshold, undetected or underestimated by most intelligence businesses on the earth, most notably the U.S. intelligence group. Such a lapse wouldn’t solely expose a blind spot in monitoring Iran—it will additionally solid doubt on the broader credibility and responsiveness of the establishments charged with monitoring international nuclear threats. After having it proper in February 2022 about Russia’s intentions to launch a full scale invasion of Ukraine, did the U.S. intelligence group have all of it mistaken about assessing Iran’s nuclear capabilities?
But when the prevailing consensus was appropriate—that Iran had not but made the choice to construct a bomb—then the implications are much more disturbing. In that case, the Israeli and US strikes don’t level to a failure of intelligence gathering by western intelligence businesses for a number of years, however to a critical politicization of intelligence. It will recommend that Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer weren’t launched in response to an imminent nuclear risk, however slightly because the end result of long-planned navy goals—justified earlier than and after the actual fact by selectively framed intelligence designed to suit a pre-existing resolution for warfare. It’s the form of political maneuver that may little doubt be scrutinized and debated by intelligence historians for a few years.
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